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Abstract 
This study used an adaptation of the belief bias paradigm and correlational analyses to 
investigate the effects of validity, believability, content, and anxiety level on syllogistic 
reasoning in a sample comprised of undergraduate students and volunteers from the general 
population within a dual process framework. All the variables were found to affect reasoning 
accuracy, but content did not affect endorsement rate. These patterns of responding were 
not due solely to working memory differences, and accuracy decreases in high-anxious 
participants were found not to be due to a reliance on belief-biased processing resulting from 
working memory depletion, thus suggesting that what determines the engagement of the 
analytic and heuristic processes in the dual process theory of reasoning is not cognitive load. 
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Introduction 
 
The construct of working memory, originally proposed by Baddeley (1986, Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974), has been a useful tool for the explanation of experimental results for over 
thirty years. The original multifactor construct, developed to replace the 'short term 
memory' aspect of Atkinson and Shiffrin's (1968) 'Multi-store Model of Memory', 
consisting of the visuo-spatial sketch-pad, primary acoustic store and a phonological 
loop, all of which are controlled by a central executive, has proven a durable and 
empirically supported model. This model of working memory has recently been 
reworked by Repovš and Baddeley (2006) to incorporate the voluminous research that 
has been conducted on the construct over the years, but it remains essentially the 
same structurally. 
The different components of working memory have been shown to differentially 
affect a variety of cognitive tasks (see Matlin, 2003, for an overview). For example, the 
visuo-spatial sketch-pad has been implicated in spatial tasks and object recognition 
(Brandimonte, Hitch, & Bishop, 1992), and the phonological loop and primary acoustic 
store have played a great explanatory role in the field of psycholinguistics (for 
example, Garman, 1990). A number of what could be termed 'meta-components' of 
working memory have also been discussed in the literature. These aspects cover 
concepts such as working memory span, memory used to create a sense of time, and 
a verbal versus non-verbal distinctions between tasks performed by the components 
of working memory (Barkley, 2006). Within the thinking and reasoning literature, 
working memory has also played a major role in research on reasoning ability, that is, 
the ability to derive logical conclusions from premises or effectively perform tasks such 
as those that require the manipulation and combination of information. The general 
pattern of association between working memory and reasoning ability is one of a 
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positive correlation, regardless of what measures of working memory are used and 
what reasoning tasks are utilised (Dutke & Stöber, 2001; Newstead, Handley, Harley, 
Wright, & Farrelly, 2004). 
Similarly to working memory research generally, a number of studies have 
demonstrated differential involvement of working memory components across different 
types of reasoning tasks (Phillips, Wynn, Gilhooy, Della Sala, & Logie, 1999; Ford, 
1995; Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004). For example, Handley, 
Capon, Copp, and Harper (2002) found correlations between the spatial reasoning 
'Tower of Hanoi' task and spatial memory capacity, but no correlation between these 
and verbal working memory measures. To complete the dissociation in their study 
they also showed a positive correlation between performance on conditional reasoning 
tasks and verbal working memory. Although this and other experiments seem to show 
unitary functioning of the components of working memory, researchers such as Lehto 
(1996) claim to provide evidence from correlational analyses of a range of working 
memory measures that there is not one, single pool of resources that can be allocated 
to the components by the central executive. However, what is meant by 'resources' in 
this critique is not entirely clear, and, as pointed out by Handley et al. (2002) the 
sample size, being one of only thirty-five, was small in comparison to the majority of 
individual differences research, and therefore may have been insufficient to detect 
meaningful differences. Whether there is one pool or separate allowances for verbal 
and spatial tasks, the differences in unitary functioning, and effects of cognitive load 
on central executive functioning have still been widely found and remain within the 
working memory model’s power of explanation (Repovš & Baddeley, 2006).  
In the emotion and cognition literature, anxiety, defined as autonomic central 
nervous system arousal, has been shown to affect performance on working memory 
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tasks. Although numerous different theories with vastly differing specifics have been 
proposed as to the structure and taxonomy of emotion (Strongman, 2003; Feldman-
Barrett, & Russell, 1999; Kunda, 1994) and how increased anxiety leads to poorer 
performance on complex cognitive tasks (Derakshan, & Eysenck, 1998; Hopko, 
Ashcraft, Ruggiero, & Lewis, 1998; McNally, 1998; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000; Luk, 1998; 
Goldstein & Blackman, 1978), there seems to be an underlying agreement that anxiety 
is caused by, or based on, task-irrelevant thoughts, which use the finite resources of 
working memory (Elliman, Green, Rogers, & Finch, 1997), and so, leave less 
resources available for the completion of the tasks (Dusek, 1980). ‘Resources’ across 
the literature is a term that has been widely and variously defined. In this study it is 
taken to refer to attentional span and control, memory span, and the ability to 
complete concurrent tasks. Such a failing of attentional processes might be accounted 
for by problems with the metacognitive ability of inhibitory control thought to be 
determined by the central executive, which has been posited as deficient in anxious 
individuals (Van Boxtel, Van der Molen, Jennings, & Brunia, 2001).   
An interesting study by Dutke and Stöber (2001) presents data that suggests 
the link between working memory and task relevant and irrelevant demands isn’t quite 
as straight forward. Despite performing worse on average across tasks, high test-
anxious individuals perform relatively better on tasks with high sequential demands 
than they do on tasks with low sequential demands. That is, the more a task requires 
an individual to monitor and update task-relevant information, the less of an impact 
test-anxiety has. The explanation for this proposed by Dutke and Stöber (2001) is that 
tasks low in sequential demands allow the individual time to dwell on task-irrelevant, 
anxious, thoughts, and this allocation of resources away from the task is detrimental to 
performance. However, in the high-sequential-demand tasks, intrinsic task prompts 
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result in sustained attention and allocation of resources to task relevant information, 
countering the misallocation of resources due to anxiety. 
However, other researchers such as Eysenck and Calvo (1992) in their 
processing efficiency theory have shown that increasing cognitive load can increase 
the impact of anxiety. This suggests that it is not working memory capacity itself that 
determines the impact of anxiety on task performance, but is more likely to be the 
allocation of those resources that determines the impact. Given that the central 
executive is widely accepted as controlling allocation of working memory resources 
(Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996), it seems possible that a more efficient central 
executive would better allocate resources and thus lead to reduced anxiety (Zahra, 
2006). In the case of Dutke and Stöber’s (2001) findings, the higher sequential 
demands could be seen as cueing the central executive to allocate more resources to 
the task-relevant information, thus improving performance. However, the poorer 
performance of test-anxious individuals generally across tasks suggests that anxiety 
affects the efficiency of resource allocation, or vice versa. It follows then that those 
higher in central executive functioning would suffer less as a result of higher task 
demands, and be less affected by anxiety. Better reasoners would show less impact 
or signs of anxiety because their central executive’s more effectively allocate 
resources to task relevant information. Given that individuals higher in working 
memory central executive (WMCE) control are supposedly better able to allocate 
resources effectively to relevant tasks, and perform better at reasoning tasks 
(Gilhooly, Logie & Wynn, 1999; DeNeys, 2006a) any investigation of the link between 
WMCE and reasoning might be expected to find a positive correlation between WMCE 
and reasoning ability (for example, Süβ, Oberaurer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 
2002).  
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This leads then to the question of whether anxiety can be linked to reasoning 
ability through the systems of working memory, and whether such a model could be 
accommodated within an existing theory of cognitive functioning. One study conducted 
by Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & Williams (1996) investigated the effects of mood on 
reasoning performance using the Wason selection task (Matlin, 2003). They reported 
that both positive and negative mood induction suppresses normative reasoning 
strategies. By way of explanation, Oaksford et al (1996) refer to a reliance on default 
responses under high cognitive load conditions. They also adopt the tripartite working 
memory model of Baddeley (1986; 1997; Repovš & Baddeley, 2006), which places the 
central executive as the system that would control resource allocation, as a 
mechanism underling their explanation. Furthermore, although Oaksford et al. (1996) 
make use of the idea of an ‘optimal hypothesis testing strategy’ (p491) to explain their 
results, the dual process theory (DPT) of Evans (2004; 2006) would provide a similar 
and more parsimonious account, that emotions reduce resources which render 
analytic processes unable to operate. Additionally, the dual process theory of 
reasoning can incorporate other models of cognitive resource management, such as 
processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and other theories such as that 
of Blanchette and Richards (2004) which posit working memory as the mechanism 
through which emotions affect cognition. The specifics of this dual process model and 
how it can incorporate working memory and emotion are discussed below. 
This hypothesis, that anxiety disrupts the central executive component of 
working memory, (Dutke & Stöber, 2001; Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005) and so 
would disrupt its allocation of resources to the different components of working 
memory, is also in-line with the suggestion of a differential allocation hypothesis 
(Oaksford et al. 1996) that suggests it is the allocation of resources rather than the 
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availability of resources that causes the observed deterioration in cognitive 
functioning. Although such a hypothesis has not previously been incorporated in the 
DPT as an explanation of when the different systems are used, it has been applied to 
reading span and other higher cognitive functions by Turley-Ames and Whitfield 
(2003), whose theoretical model is compatible with the DPT and provides a 
mechanism similar to that proposed by Blanchette and Richards (2006) by which 
central executive loading would determine heuristic and analytic responding through 
resource allocation. 
The DPT of reasoning (Evans, 2003, 2006; Evans & Over, 1996a) therefore 
seems to provide a framework within which the link between anxiety and reasoning 
ability can be explored, and working memory considered as a common factor. 
Although a wide variety of other descriptive and prescriptive theories can be found in 
the literature, for example, logicism (Oaksford & Chater, 1998) or the mental models 
theory (Garnham & Oakhill, 1997; Manktelow, 2000), that could provide a framework 
for such a combination, DPT seems to have already pulled together under one 
theoretical explanation a variety of empirical data, by providing a way of combining 
emotion-as-load and deficits in reasoning, thus lending itself to tentative explanations 
of findings from the combined areas of cognition and emotion and thinking and 
reasoning. In the dual-process theory of Evans (2003; Evans & Coventry, 2003) 
reasoning tasks are seen as being processed by one of two systems which utilise 
different methods. Normatively logical reasoning is associated with the analytic system 
and heuristic, pragmatic reasoning is attributed to the automatic responding of the 
heuristic system (De Neys, 2006a). It then follows that working memory, through its 
association with reasoning ability, could be considered a component necessary for 
analytic system functioning. Such a link between working memory and the analytic 
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system has been put forward by researchers such as Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, and 
Conway (1999) and Kyllonen and Christal (1990), and is discussed in detail by De 
Neys, (2006b). This conceptualisation of the heuristic processes as irrational, or, to 
sidestep the rationality debate, 'non-normative' (Evans, Venn, Feeney, 2002; 
Stanovich & West, 1999; Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993), has been proposed as an 
explanation of a variety of empirical demonstrations of the belief bias effect 
(Stanovich, 1999; Manktelow, 2000). As summarised by Evans (2004), the belief bias 
effect is the tendency to endorse believable conclusions more often than unbelievable 
ones, regardless of logical accuracy, or as outlined by Evans and Over (1996a), 
deductive inferences being biased by the believability of the conclusions.  
In the standard belief bias paradigm, as presented by Evans, Barston, and 
Pollard (1983), validity and believability of syllogism conclusions are varied within a 
two-by-two analysis of variance. Participants score one point for each endorsement 
they make, that is, for each time they respond ‘valid’, regardless of the syllogism’s 
logical accuracy. This method allows for an investigation of the main effects of both 
validity and believability, as well as any interactions between the two. The findings of 
these experiments typically find that believable conclusions are endorsed more often 
than unbelievable ones, such that a main and interaction effect for believability and 
validity are found. This is generally accepted as allowing the measurement of belief 
based and logical responding through comparing responses to different validity and 
believability levels of syllogism. Although the belief bias effect had been studied prior 
to the Evans et al. (1983) study, as discussed by Evans himself (Evans, 2004), the 
methodology and framework within the investigations were lacking rigour and control. 
In order to link emotion and cognition research with thinking and reasoning, the 
belief-bias paradigm can be expanded to include factors measuring content effects 
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and anxiety effects. As little research has been conducted on the effects of syllogism 
content, specifically emotive content, and as research that has investigated the effects 
of anxiety on reasoning in non-clinical populations is scarce (Blanchette & Richards, 
2004), the addition of content and anxiety-level factors to the belief bias paradigm 
would allow a combination of the two fields in such a way as to address a gap in our 
knowledge of how anxiety, content, validity and believability interact in the general 
population. Furthermore, scoring responses by both endorsement and logical 
accuracy whilst investigating both content and anxiety level allows an expansion of 
Oaksford et al’s (1996) results that found any emotional content to suppress logical 
responding, by investigating how existing anxiety-level interacts with problem content. 
In such a paradigm, syllogisms with anxiety-related content might be expected 
to increase belief bias by increasing the salience of anxious, task-irrelevant thoughts, 
which would then redirect or occupy working memory resources. Such a situation 
might be considered as forcing the individual to resort to their ‘default’ heuristic 
processing system, and so, would be expected to increase belief bias. Furthermore, if 
such systems result in processes such as matching bias (Manktelow, 2000), and other 
non-normative approaches to reasoning tasks (Stanovich & West, 1998a; 1998b), 
then accuracy would also be expected to be reduced. Such hypotheses are supported 
in part by early research by Eysenck, MacLeod, and Mathews (1987), and later 
findings in a similar vein (Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005; Perowne & Mansell, 
2002) that report a greater degree of attention allocation to stimuli perceived as 
threatening (Wenzlaff, Rude, & West, 1996; Yovel & Mineka, 2005); such as exam-
related content might be by assessment anxious individuals. The link here between 
DPT and working memory is made through perceiving the central executive as an 
attentional system (Baddeley, 1997), selecting stimuli and allocating resources to one 
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of the two reasoning systems in order to decide on a response. Different allocation 
strategies would lead to focus on different aspects of the problem and therefore 
different types of response (Ansburg & Hill, 2003); belief based ones with the heuristic 
system, logically valid ones with the analytic system. In this way, by manipulating not 
only the validity and believability of conclusions, but also the content of the syllogisms, 
it is hoped that the relatively recent linking of anxiety to reasoning tasks (for example, 
Capon, Handley, & Dennis, 2003) might be continued and extended using a modified 
version of the belief bias paradigm. Based on the literature that suggests deficits in 
cognitive processes due to anxiety (Yovel & Mineka, 2005; Krikorian, Zimmerman, & 
Fleck, 2004), it would be expected that high-anxious individuals would show a main 
effect for syllogism content, and, more specifically, reduced accuracy on anxiety-
related content. This follows from the findings that anxiety-prone individuals show 
selective attention for threat related stimuli and processing of these stimuli would 
reduce the resources available to process anxiety-related syllogisms. This is contrary 
to the findings by Johnson-Laird, Mancini, and Gangemi (2006) that individuals reason 
more accurately on material related to personal psychological problems, however, 
their hyper-emotion theory predictions are based on a clinical population. This study 
intends to look at anxiety in the general population, and as such, individuals would be 
expected to have less expertise regarding their worries and related content. 
Alongside the belief bias paradigm as a tool for investigating the link between 
anxiety and reasoning ability, correlational analyses would allow replications of 
previous research.  As such, measures of WMCE would be expected to correlate 
positively with reasoning accuracy, based on the dual-process theory’s idea of two 
systems competing for resources, and the central executive being the most likely 
construct to be in control of this allocation. Furthermore, correlations between anxiety 
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and reasoning ability, as measured by accuracy, as well as anxiety and working 
memory, would be expected to show a negative relationship. A negative relationship 
between WMCE and reasoning ability, as well as negative correlations between 
anxiety and reasoning ability are predicted, based on the assumption that anxious 
states require maintenance which require cognitive resources (Gilhooly, Logie, 
Wetherick, & Wynn, 1993) that would otherwise be used to process material 
analytically. This pattern of correlations would provide replications of prior studies that 
show anxiety to impair reasoning accuracy. A negative correlation between WMCE 
functioning and anxiety level might be taken to suggest that those individuals with less 
control over resource allocation suffer more from anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2002), or that anxiety reduces the amount of cognitive resources dedicated to the 
working memory tasks; as no task has yet been devised to measure clearly the central 
executive’s ability to control resource allocation (Oaksford et al, 1996). Utilising the 
belief bias paradigm alongside correlational analyses would allow for any observed 
interaction effects to shed light on the directionality of the correlations. 
In summary, adding content and anxiety level factors to the belief bias 
paradigm of Evans et al. (1983), alongside a measure of working memory, allows for 
the incorporation of the predictions of models such as the processing efficiency theory 
and a variety of other emotion based theories of reasoning, and allows the following 
predictions to be tested by using measures of endorsement and accuracy; Main 
effects will be found for validity and believability on endorsement and accuracy rates 
as found in previous studies. Furthermore, high anxiety levels and anxiety content are 
expected to reduce reasoning accuracy by depleting working memory resources, such 
that individuals will have to rely on heuristic responses such as believability.  
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Method 
 
Participants 
Participants in this study were volunteers and undergraduate psychology students at 
the University of Plymouth participating as part of a course requirement (N=77, 11 
male, 66 female). However, due to technical difficulties, not all data sets were received 
for all measures, resulting in slightly different sample sizes for each analysis. 
Design 
In order to answer the research questions of interest, the first part of the experimental 
design is a correlational one to allow an investigation of the direction and strength of 
any relationships between working memory central executive functioning, assessment 
anxiety, and reasoning ability. Any significant trends found will be subject to 
regression analyses in order to assess effect sizes and the relative impact of each 
factor on the other, as well as construct regression equations to evaluate the 
predictive value of each variable.  
In order to assess belief bias and any interaction between validity, believability, 
content, and anxiety level, a partial-within quasi-experimental analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) design; 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 2 Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) 
x 2 Content (Anxiety related, Neutral) with 2 Anxiety level (High, Low) as a between-
subject variable will be used. 
Following this, WMCE will be added as a between-subjects covaried factor 
under an ANCOVA design to control for individual differences in working memory 
capacity, and to test the robustness of any effects found in the ANOVA. 
The above mentioned ANOVA and ANCOVA designs will first be run using 
reasoning accuracy as a dependent variable to assess logical accuracy, and then re-
[245] 
 
ran with endorsement rate as the dependent variable to assess belief biased 
responding, and allow for an investigation of the relationships between the two.  
Furthermore, recording of endorsement as well as accuracy data allows for the 
construction of a range of indices to separate different aspects of the design in such a 
way as to allow for further correlational analyses in order to clarify any relationships 
found by the initial correlations or the ANOVA.  
These were computed as follows; Logic Index Anxiety Content = (AVB+AVU) 
endorsements – (AIB+AIU) endorsements, Logic Index Neutral Content = (NVB+NVU) 
endorsements – (NIB+NIU) endorsements, Belief Index = (VB+IB) endorsements – 
(VU+IU) endorsements, Conflict Index = (VU+IB) accuracy, and the Non-Conflict Index 
= (VB+IU) accuracy. 
Calculating a logic index provides a measure of performance on the syllogisms 
that is measured by normatively rational responding, irrespective of content or 
believability. This is split by content to avoid the possibility of opposite patterns 
negating each other. The belief index allows for an assessment of endorsement rate 
irrespective of validity or content, and the conflict and non-conflict indices create an 
opportunity to evaluate individuals’ accuracy as a function of belief-logic conflict. 
Partial correlations will be conducted if any significant correlations are found in order 
to control for working memory and reasoning ability to assess the robustness of any 
relationships. Furthermore, regression analyses will be conducted to further examine 
the relationships between any significant correlations. 
Higher scores on these indices reflect a higher reliance on beliefs in 
responding, more normatively logical responding on anxiety related syllogisms, more 
normatively logical responding on neutral syllogisms, and higher logical responding on 
conflict and non-conflict items respectively.  
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Materials: Working Memory Measures 
In order to provide a measure of working memory central executive (WMCE) 
functioning, an adaptation of the program 'Sentences', developed by Capon (Capon, 
Handley, & Dennis, 2003) was used. The adaptations were made to allow it to be run 
from a web-based server in order to avoid room restrictions and time constraints. This 
section of the experimental program presents participants with groups of sentences, to 
which they have to respond true or false. After each set of sentences, which range 
from one sentence to seven sentences long, participants have to recall the last word 
of each sentence in the set, similar to the sentence validation tasks used by Daneman 
and Carpenter (1983). 
True-False indications were made by clicking true or false buttons on screen 
with the computer mouse. Word recall responses were collected through keyboard 
input into a text box in the program between true-false verification sections. 
Participants controlled the speed of progression themselves as they were required to 
click on each sentence after verification to display the next sentence. Recall sections 
were indicated by the word 'RECALL' appearing on-screen after the last sentence in 
each set was verified. 
 WMCE scores were calculated as the mean number of words recalled over the 
seven trial blocks based on weighted averages of each block to correct for the 
variation in the number of sentences that had to be verified between each recall cue. 
A working memory span task was also created using strings of ten randomly 
generated numbers. This task required participants to view a string of ten numbers for 
ten seconds, and then recall as many as they could. However, following a small scale 
pilot (N=4, 1 male, 3 female) of this and the other working memory measures, the 
span task was excluded due to running-time restrictions. 
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Materials: Assessment Anxiety Scales 
The Assessment Anxiety Scale consists of both an adapted version of the Test 
Anxiety Inventory (TAI) (Sarason, 1978; Spielberger, Gonzalez, Taylor, Algaze, & 
Anton 1978; UIOWA, 2006), and the revised Anxious Thoughts and Tendencies Scale 
(ATT; Uhlenhuth, McCarty, Paine & Warner, 1999). 
The TAI used consists of thirty-five of the original fifty items. The fifteen items 
that were not used comprised the subscales for 'concerns about not being prepared 
for a test' and 'concerns over future security', as well as items that were rephrasings of 
other items. 
The TAI items remaining can be summed together to give an overall test-
anxiety score (AAtot), or can be grouped into subscales from two broad groups; 
Sources of Test Anxiety and Main Expressions of Test Anxiety. Within the Sources of 
Test Anxiety there are subscales measuring ‘Concerns about how others will view you 
if you do poorly’ and ‘Concerns about self-image’. Within the Main Expressions of Test 
Anxiety there are subscales measuring ‘Bodily Reactions’ (see also Thompson, 1988, 
for details of physiological mechanisms involved bodily responses to anxiety), 
‘Thought Disruptions’, and ‘General Test-Anxiety’ 
The ATT consists of fifteen items, looking at the tendency to adopt an anxious 
cognitive style. These items were embedded as a subscale of the overall anxiety 
measure. All of the items in this combined scale were responded to on a five point 
Likert scale, the sums of which provide an assessment anxiety total, equivalent to the 
sum of the ATT and TAI totals, and separate scores for each of the subscales of the 
TAI. Given that each of the scales and subscales provided output that was an index of 
anxiety, with higher values being indicative of higher anxiety, summing the totals of 
each was deemed justified. This is further justified by the average item-total 
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correlation for the combine scale being relatively high, r=.584, supporting the idea that 
each item, subscale, and scale, is measuring the same construct.  
A small scale pre-test using volunteers drawn from the student population 
(N=14, 2 male, 12 female) showed the internal-reliability of the combined ATT and TAI 
scale to be α=.96. Individual Cronbach's Alpha test-retest reliability coefficients were 
found to be α=.95 and α=.94 for the ATT and TAI items respectively, above 
acceptable levels for the purpose of this study. The split half reliability coefficient for 
the combined scale after correction with the Spearman-Brown correction formula for 
using a divided sample to create two halves was r = .992. These measures indicate 
that both the TAI and ATT measure similar constructs, and support the decision to 
sum the totals to provide a single measure.  
 
Materials: Syllogisms 
The syllogisms for the reasoning measure were adapted from examples 
published by Bacon, Handley, and Newstead (2003), Capon et al. (2003), Garnham 
and Oakhill (1997), Manktelow (2000), and Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, and 
Farrelly, (2004). In line with the standard belief bias paradigm (Evans et al., 1983), 
there were four sets of syllogisms, based on the status of their conclusions. These 
were valid believable, valid unbelievable, invalid believable and invalid unbelievable.  
A pre-test of the syllogisms was conducted as a manipulation check in order to 
ascertain whether there were significant differences in believability between 
conclusions from each of the categories. A small sample of volunteers (N=14, 2 male, 
12 female) were emailed a list of the conclusions taken from the syllogisms intended 
to be used in the belief bias measure, and asked to rate each of the conclusions on a 
nine-point Likert scale ranging from ‘totally unbelievable’ to ‘totally believable’. 
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The results of this belief ratings pre-test showed that there was good inter-rater 
reliability, and when the results were split by believability, to investigate whether the 
difference in ratings of believability between the two levels (believable, unbelievable) 
was statistically significant, a within subjects t-test was conducted. The results of the t-
test showed the believable items (M=7.46, SD=.72) to be rated as significantly more 
believable than the unbelievable items (M=4.02, SD=.83), t(13)=11.74 p<0.01. 
In order to investigate the effects of content related to assessment anxiety, a 
further set of loaded syllogisms were created by replacing the neutral words in the 
thematic syllogisms with assessment anxiety related words such as ‘test’ and ‘exam’ 
(See Appendix A). Within this loaded set, the four groups were still present; valid 
believable, valid unbelievable, invalid believable, and invalid unbelievable. 
As this was part of a larger study, two further sets of syllogisms were created 
with eating-disorder related content, giving a total of 48 syllogisms. However, due to 
extremely significant correlations between the anxiety measures used, and the eating 
disorder inventory, second edition, (EDI2; Garner, 1991) scores, r=+.674, n=68, 
p<.001, two-tailed, the three loaded sets of syllogisms were collapsed into one group 
by averaging totals within each category. 
The result of this is to provide eight categories of syllogism; Neutral-Valid-
Believable (NVB), Neutral-Valid-Unbelievable (NVU), Neutral-Invalid-Believable (NIB), 
Neutral-Invalid-Unbelievable (NIU), and Anxiety-related-Valid-Believable (AVB), 
Anxiety-related-Valid-Unbelievable (AVU), Anxiety-related-Invalid-Believable (AIB), 
Anxiety-related -Invalid-Unbelievable (AIU). 
This number of categories allows an investigation of main effects for validity, 
believability, and content, as well as allowing an analysis of any interactions between 
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factors. These were randomly ordered within the reasoning section of the experiment 
to avoid order effects between validity, believability, or loading. 
 
Procedure: Administration of Measures 
Each of the experimental measures was written into a self-administering web-
based program by one of the experimenters, and the results were emailed 
automatically to the experimenters for each section completed by each participant. 
Anonymity was assured through the use of participant identification numbers that were 
issued for each participant to input at the start of each section of the program. 
Informed consent was obtained from laboratory and geographically distant participants 
by including a brief at the start of the program, and a detailed consent form. 
Participants were told that by clicking to continue they were giving their informed 
consent and that they were over eighteen year of age. Debriefing was achieved by the 
inclusion of a detailed brief that was presented by the program upon completion of the 
study. Contact details of the experimenters and supervisors were provided on the 
same screen as the brief, with a paragraph informing participants that they could email 
for further information or to have their data withdrawn. Individuals’ right to withdraw 
was ensured through the inclusion of a ‘withdraw’ button on each screen, and a 
paragraph in the brief drawing attention to their right to withdraw and explaining that 
they could do so at any time without incurring any penalty.  (For technical details of the 
experiment, please contact the author) 
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Procedure 
 
Participants who were geographically distant were emailed a web-link to the study 
along with a participant identification number, where they were asked to follow the 
onscreen instructions. This group of participants were asked to complete the study in 
a quiet room, and were asked to sign into an instant messaging service so that the 
experimenter could provide real-time support and assistance if necessary. Participants 
who were able to attend laboratory sessions were seated in front of desktop 
computers that had been connected to the internet and were set up to show the study 
website in the browser window. Both groups then followed the onscreen instructions 
which guided them through the different sections of the study. 
The first screen was a consent and confirmation of age page. Laboratory 
participants also signed a paper consent form at this stage. This was followed by the 
brief and instructions. The working memory section was presented after this. Following 
completion of the WMCE measure, instructions for the syllogistic reasoning section 
were presented, along with an example. The 48 syllogisms followed. Next in the 
sequence, participants were presented with instructions on how to complete the 
assessment anxiety measure, which were followed by the TAI and ATT items in a 
random order. Upon completion of the assessment anxiety combined scale, 
instructions were presented on how to complete the EDI2 section. The EDI2 items 
then followed, succeeded by a debrief page. 
Upon completion of each section, participants were directed to click a submit 
button, which emailed the results for that section to the experimenters. 
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Results 
 
Correlations 
Significant correlations were found between both the ATT and TAI, r=+.703, n=63, 
p<.001, two-tailed. Furthermore, significant positive correlations were found between 
the TAI total and its subscales. Given the high degree of inter-scale correlations, 
theses measures were summed to give an anxiety total (AAtot). Table B1.0 in 
Appendix B shows a complete correlation matrix. Yellow cells highlight AAtot, ATT, 
and TAI correlations. Orange cells highlight inter-subscale correlations. 
The correlations between anxiety scales and WMCE (blue cells in table B1.0) 
show a general trend of negative correlation, although only that with the ‘views of 
others’ subscale reaches significance. Overall, as anxiety increases, WMCE 
performance decreases. 
Reasoning ability shows a positive, although non-significant, relationship with 
WMCE, and a general pattern of negative correlations with measures of anxiety. This 
negative relationship reaches significance for the subscales; TAI total, r=-.244, n=73, 
p=.038, Self Image, r=-.237, n=73, p=.044, and General Anxiety, r=-.290, n=73, 
p=.013, all two-tailed. 
 
Accuracy ANOVA 
Syllogism responses were first scored for accuracy. Due to technical problems 
during compilation of the data sets, not all participants’ submitted a complete data-set, 
and so, the sub-sample for the following analyses of reasoning accuracy comprises 
data from 64 of the 77 who took part in the study (9 male, 55 female). 
In order to investigate the effects of content, and the validity and believability of 
the conclusions on syllogistic reasoning ability, a 2 Content (Anxiety, Neutral) x 2 
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Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 2 Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 Anxiety (High, 
Low) analysis of variance was conducted.  
Content, Validity, and Believability were entered as within-subjects variables. 
Anxiety-Group factor levels were defined as above- and below-median based on the 
AAtot and was included as a between subjects variable. The descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 1.0 (see Table B1.1 in Appendix B for the full ANOVA table). 
Table 1.0 Descriptive Statistics for the Syllogism Groups based on 
Accuracy Scores 
Syllogism 
Category 
Anxiety Group 
(Median Split) 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
N 
AVB 
Low Anxiety 2.6576 .38049 34 
High Anxiety 2.7340 .33240 30 
AVU 
Low Anxiety 2.1556 .36916 34 
High Anxiety 2.1120 .60854 30 
AIB 
Low Anxiety 1.9215 .59321 34 
High Anxiety 1.6343 .73999 30 
AIU 
Low Anxiety 1.8344 .60389 34 
High Anxiety 1.8227 .71517 30 
NVB 
Low Anxiety 2.6765 .53488 34 
High Anxiety 2.8333 .37905 30 
NVU 
Low Anxiety 2.8235 .57580 34 
High Anxiety 2.7000 .83666 30 
NIB 
Low Anxiety 2.4706 .70648 34 
High Anxiety 1.7667 .89763 30 
NIU 
Low Anxiety 2.0000 .85280 34 
High Anxiety 1.9667 .80872 30 
 
The ANOVA based on accuracy rates found a significant main effects for content, 
F(1,62)= 39.347, p<.001, eta2=.388 ,validity, F(1,62)= 92.339, p<.001, eta2=.598, and 
believability F(1,62)= 9.066, p=.004, eta2=.128, as well as a main effect for anxiety 
group, F(1,62)= .145, p=.034, eta2=2.176. Comparing the means of content groups 
shows that reasoning is less accurate on syllogisms with anxiety-related content 
(M=2.109) than neutral content (M=2.405). Reasoning is also more accurate on valid 
(M=2.587) than invalid syllogisms (M=1.927). Accuracy was also higher on believable 
(M=2.337) than unbelievable syllogisms (M=2.177). Furthermore, low-anxious 
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individuals (M=2.317) were more accurate on average than high-anxious individuals 
(M=2.196). As an aside, although difference in mean score may seem small, the 
scores could only range from zero to three. 
Significant two-way interaction effects were found between validity and anxiety 
group, F(1,62)= 4.031, p=.049, eta2=.061, and between content and believability, 
F(1,62)= 5.670, p=.020, eta2=.084. Plots of these interaction effects are shown in 
figures 1.1a and 1.1b respectively. 
 
Individuals perform less accurately overall when conclusions are invalid, and high-
anxious individuals are less accurate than low-anxious individuals when conclusions 
are invalid. 
Reasoning accuracy is generally lower on syllogisms with unbelievable 
conclusions, but this also interacts with syllogism content, resulting in lower general 
performance for anxiety-related content, with the lowest accuracy being found for 
syllogisms with anxiety-related content and unbelievable conclusions. 
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There were also significant three-way interactions between validity, 
believability, and anxiety group, F(1,62)= 7.387, p=.009, eta2=.106, and content, 
validity, and believability, F(1,62)= 15.615, p<.001, eta2=.201. The plots for these 
interactions are shown in figures 1.2 and 1.3. From the results shown in figure 1.2, it 
can be seen that anxiety related content exacerbates the effects of both believability 
and validity by reducing reasoning accuracy. It can also be seen that there is a large 
effect of content on valid unbelievable syllogisms, with anxiety related content 
decreasing accuracy by nearly a third.  
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From the plots shown in figure 1.3, it can be seen that although similar patterns 
of responding is seen between high and low anxious groups on valid conclusions 
across believability levels, when the conclusions are invalid, there is a different pattern 
of interaction between believability and anxiety group. Low-anxious individuals show a 
relatively standard pattern of interaction between validity and believability, responding 
less accurately moving from valid-believable, to valid-unbelievable, to invalid-
believable, to invalid-unbelievable. However, high-anxious individuals respond lower 
overall, but show an increase in accuracy between invalid-believable and invalid-
unbelievable. This suggests that anxiety reduces, or even reverses the effect of 
believability on syllogistic reasoning.  
There were minor deviations from homogeneity of variance for the anxiety 
content, valid, and unbelievable syllogism groups (Levene’s test significant at p=.014), 
and the neutral, valid, believable syllogism group (Levene’s test significant at p=.008). 
Given the minority deviation (two out of eight groups), and that square-root, 
logarithmic, and reciprocal transformations confound the problem and exaggerate the 
deviation, the data were used in their untransformed state. The statistical robustness 
of an ANOVA design allows for slight deviations from homogeneity without excessive 
distortion of the results, and so, the use of untransformed data was considered 
acceptable.  
 
Accuracy ANCOVA 
Following the analysis of variance above, working memory central executive scores 
were included in an analysis of covariance in order to statistically control for 
differences between participants’ working memory ability (table B1.2; full table in 
Appendix B). Covarying WMCE mediated but did not eliminate the effects found in the 
[257] 
 
ANOVA for accuracy, leaving only the main effects for WMCE score and Anxiety 
Group, F(1,58)= .207, p=.027, eta2=1.628, and , F(1,58)= .252, p=.023, eta2=1.337, 
respectively, as well as a three-way interaction between validity, believability, and 
anxiety group, F(1,58)= 5.740, p=.020, eta2=.090 as statistically significant. The 
patterns of these interactions are the same as those found prior to covarying WMCE. 
Endorsement ANOVA 
In order to further investigate the relationships found with accuracy scores, the 
syllogism responses were re-scored based on endorsement rate rather than accuracy. 
That is, the number of syllogisms to which participants’ responded ‘valid’, regardless 
of the logical status of the conclusions. Descriptive statistics are shown in table 2.0 
(full ANOVA table is shown in Appendix B, table B2.0) 
Table 2.0 Descriptive Statistics based on Endorsement Rate 
Syllogism 
Category 
Anxiety Group 
(Median Split) 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
AVB 
Low Anxiety 2.6576 .38049 34 
High Anxiety 2.7340 .33240 30 
Total 2.6934 .35800 64 
AVU 
Low Anxiety 2.1556 .36916 34 
High Anxiety 2.1120 .60854 30 
Total 2.1352 .49227 64 
AIB 
Low Anxiety 1.0785 .59321 34 
High Anxiety 1.3657 .73999 30 
Total 1.2131 .67620 64 
AIU 
Low Anxiety 1.1656 .60389 34 
High Anxiety 1.1773 .71517 30 
Total 1.1711 .65307 64 
NVB 
Low Anxiety 2.6765 .53488 34 
High Anxiety 2.8333 .37905 30 
Total 2.7500 .47140 64 
NVU 
Low Anxiety 2.8235 .57580 34 
High Anxiety 2.7000 .83666 30 
Total 2.7656 .70693 64 
NIB 
Low Anxiety .5294 .70648 34 
High Anxiety 1.2333 .89763 30 
Total .8594 .87045 64 
NIU 
Low Anxiety 1.0000 .85280 34 
High Anxiety 1.0333 .80872 30 
Total 1.0156 .82601 64 
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A significant main effect for validity was found, F(1,62)= 339.034, p<.001, eta2=.845, 
as well as a significant main effect for anxiety group, F(1,62)= 4.031, p=.049, 
eta2=.061. Comparisons of the means of the levels shows that invalid conclusions 
(M=1.073) were endorsed less than valid conclusions (M=2.587), and that high low-
anxious individuals endorsed more conclusions overall (M=1.899) than low-anxious 
individuals (M=1.761).  
Furthermore, interaction effects were found between believability and anxiety 
group, F(1,62)= 7.387, p=.009, eta2=.106, content and validity, F(1,62)= 39.347, 
p<.001, eta2=.388, content and believability, F(1,62)= 15.615, p<.001, eta2=.201, and 
validity and believability, F(1,62)= 9.066, p=.004, eta2=.128. As well as these 
interactions, a three way interaction was found between content, validity, and 
believability, F(1,62)= 5.670, p=.020, eta2=.084. 
 The patterns within the two-way interaction show that invalid conclusions are 
endorsed less than valid conclusions, and that this is exaggerated by believability, but 
primarily for valid conclusions, reducing the endorsement rate for valid-unbelievable 
conclusions to below that of valid-believable conclusions, but having little impact on 
the endorsement rates for invalid conclusions (fig.1.4a). The pattern of interaction 
between content and believability is less clear cut. (fig.1.4b). Unbelievable-Anxious 
syllogisms are endorsed less than Believable-Anxious ones, where ‘Anxious’ and 
‘Neutral’ refer to anxiety related content and neutral content respectively. However, 
with neutral syllogisms, the endorsement rate is higher for Unbelievable than 
Believable conclusions.  
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Similarly, the interaction between Validity and Content (fig.1.5a) suggests that content 
can reverse the effects of validity, with neutral-valid conclusions being endorsed more 
than anxious-valid ones, but neutral-invalid being endorsed less than anxious-invalid 
ones. The interaction between Believability and Anxiety Group (fig. 1.5b) shows no 
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significant difference between endorsements of unbelievable syllogisms, but that low 
anxious individuals endorse less believable conclusions. 
 The plots for the three way interaction found between content, validity, and 
believability (fig.1.6) suggests that the interaction between validity and believability is 
only present with anxiety-related content, and that anxious content reduces the 
endorsement rate of valid-unbelievable conclusions. 
 
 
ANCOVA 
Following the analysis of variance above, working memory central executive scores 
were included in an analysis of covariance in order to statistically control for 
differences between participants’ working memory ability (results shown in Table B2.1 
in Appendix B). Covarying WMCE reduced the size of the effects, leaving only the 
main effect for validity, F(1,58)= 9.860, p=.003, eta2=.145, and the believability x 
anxiety-group interaction, F(1,58)= 5.740, p=.020, eta2=.090, at statistically significant 
levels. However, the patterns still remained, albeit at sub-significant levels. The 
patterns shown by these effects are identical to those shown prior to covarying WMCE 
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score; invalid conclusions are endorsed less than valid ones, and the interaction plot 
resembles that shown in figure 1.5b above. 
 
Logic, Belief, Conflict, and Non-Conflict Indices 
Table 3.0 below shows the pattern for correlations between the indices 
calculated and reasoning ability, WMCE, AAtot and eating disorder proneness. 
Correlations of these measures and all of their subscales are shown in Table B3.0 of 
Appendix B. 
Table 3.0 Table of Correlation Coefficients and Alpha-levels for relationships between Indices, 
working memory, assessment anxiety, reasoning ability and eating disorder measures (N=64) 
   Indices 
 Measures   
Reasoning 
Ability 
Belief 
Logic  
Anx-related 
Logic 
Neutral 
Conflict 
Non-
Conflict 
WMCE Score Pearson .162 .175 .140 .158 -.042 .138 
  Sig .211 .176 .282 .225 .748 .289 
EDI2 total Pearson -.168 -.288(*) -.117 -.220 .288(*) .022 
  Sig .208 .028 .380 .097 .028 .869 
AAtot Pearson -.222 -.366(**) -.202 -.209 .206 -.164 
  Sig .082 .003 .115 .103 .109 .203 
Reasoning 
Ability 
  
Pearson - .177 .956(**) .762(**) -.321(**) -.176 
Sig -  .162 .000 .000 .010 .163 
Belief  Pearson .177 - .203 .034 -.605(**) .397(**) 
  Sig .162 -  .108 .792 .000 .001 
Logic ACon
1
 Pearson .956(**) .203 - .540(**) -.347(**) -.178 
  Sig .000 .108 -  .000 .005 .160 
Logic NCon
2
 Pearson .762(**) .034 .540(**) - -.143 -.128 
  Sig .000 .792 .000 -  .259 .313 
Conflict Pearson -.321(**) -.605(**) -.347(**) -.143 - .490(**) 
  Sig .010 .000 .005 .259 -  .000 
* significant at p<.05, ** significant at p<.01 
1- Logic Index based on performance on syllogisms with anxiety related content 
2- Logic Index based on performance on syllogisms with neutral content 
 
A significant positive correlation was found between reasoning ability and the 
logic index for both anxiety related and neutral content. Reasoning ability and both the 
conflict and non-conflict indices were negatively correlated, although only the former 
reached significance. 
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Anxiety, as measured by AAtot, showed patterns of negative, although non-
significant, correlations with working memory, r=-.204, n=64, p=.121, reasoning ability, 
and with logical accuracy on both anxiety-related and neutral content syllogisms. 
AAtot was also negatively correlated with accuracy on non-conflict items, but not 
conflict items. AAtot showed a significant negative correlation with belief biased 
responding. 
There was no significant correlational patterns between the belief and logic 
indices. Both assessment anxiety and eating disorder proneness increases decreased 
logical and belief biased responding. 
These patterns of correlation were still observed, although at lower significance 
levels, after partialling out working memory and reasoning ability together, and 
working memory and reasoning ability separately. (Appendix B, Table B4.0).  
A backwards regression analysis indicated that accuracy on neutral and 
anxiety-related content, reasoning ability, working memory, anxiety caused by concern 
over the views of others, bodily symptoms of anxiety, anxious thoughts, anxiety over 
self-image, general anxiety symptoms, and ATT total all provided significant predictors 
of belief biased responding, p<.05 (Table B5.0 of Appendix B). However, the most 
statistically significant model that can be derived from these variables is that based on 
reasoning ability and assessment anxiety together, resulting in a regression equation 
of Belief Index Score = 2.159  - 1.88 Views of Others  + 0.142 reasoning ability, 
predicting 20% of the variance, significant at p<.05. (Tables 4.0 below for beta values, 
and B5.1 of Appendix B for model summaries) 
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Table 4.0 Regression coefficients for model 9(RA and AA views of others subscale) with Belief 
Biased Responding as the DV  
Model 
  
Unstandardised 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
  Beta Std. Error Beta 
9 (Constant) 2.159 3.084 - .700 .487  
  AA Views Of Others -.188 .057 -.391 -3.315 .002 .199 
  Reasoning Ability .142 .069 .243 2.065 .044  
 
Discussion 
 
This study looked at the effects of believability and validity as well as content and 
anxiety level on syllogistic reasoning by assessing response accuracy and 
endorsement rates. Furthermore, this study looked at the relationships between 
working memory, anxiety, accuracy and reasoning ability, with consideration given to 
difference s between heuristic belief based responding and analytic, normatively 
logical responding. 
The accuracy data shows that people perform less accurately when syllogism 
conclusions are invalid and when conclusions are unbelievable. The interaction effect 
between these two factors seems reasonable in the light of previous belief bias 
research (Evans et al. 1983) and the emotion and cognition literature in general 
(Barlow, 1991), with accuracy decreasing from valid-believable, to valid-unbelievable, 
to invalid-believable and being worst for invalid unbelievable syllogisms. In addition to 
these effects, anxiety related content was found to reduce accuracy in comparison to 
neutral content, and high anxious individuals performed less accurately than low 
anxious individuals. Furthermore, both of these factors interacted with validity and 
believability, acting to exaggerate the effects of both separately and together. 
However, content and anxiety level appear to reduce accuracy through separate 
mechanisms, based on the fact that although both interact with the other factors, they 
do not show an interaction with each other, which is suggestive of separate causal 
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mechanisms. This pattern of results could be explained by content reducing available 
resources by drawing attention to the semantics of the thematic content (Derryberry & 
Reed, 1998) and away from the structure, which is required for logical responding, and 
increasing reliance on believability and validity as cues. In addition, anxiety level might 
impact memory as opposed to attention by occupying systems such as the 
phonological loop and short-term memory, components cited as necessary for 
syllogistic reasoning with task-irrelevant anxious thoughts. Adopting a methodology 
focusing on what individual participants are thinking, possibly from a discursive 
standpoint (Augostinos, Walker, & Donaghue, 2006; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2004), whilst 
controlling for factors such as cognitive style and motivation (Cacioppo, Petty, 
Feinstein, Blair, & Jarvis, 1996; Dusek, 1980) might allow clarification of how these 
two aspects alter what people do when reasoning.   
The patterns found within the endorsement data are interesting in that they do 
not closely fit the profile of the original belief bias study (Evans et al., 1983, p289). The 
data does show an effect for validity and anxiety group matching those found for the 
accuracy data, but the effect for belief is minimal, possibly due to the instructions to 
accept premises as true reducing reliance on belief cues. The interaction effects found 
with endorsement rates are similar to those found for accuracy data, but to a lesser 
degree. Content did not show an effect independently, but did show an interesting 
pattern of interaction, increasing endorsement rate in believable, but decreasing 
endorsement rates in unbelievable syllogisms. This seems to show that anxiety 
increases attention to the believability of conclusions, elevating the endorsement rates 
when believable, decreasing them when unbelievable, relative to endorsement rates 
for neutral content syllogisms. This again could be explained by the focusing effect of 
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content and anxiety, given that anxiety level increased the endorsement of believable 
conclusions. 
The general unusual pattern of endorsement could possibly be explained by the 
psychology students within the sample having completed various courses in logic with 
a focus on syllogistic reasoning. A general grasp of formal logic will cue individuals to 
ignore the content, but they may not have the level of understanding to perform 
normatively. This consideration could also explain why a different pattern was found 
between accuracy and endorsement data, with endorsement being affected more by 
ignoring content than accuracy, which still relies on an assessment of the structure. 
That covarying working memory dramatically reduced the effect sizes found for 
content, validity an believability as measured by both accuracy and endorsement rate 
suggests that a large part of these effects are moderated by working memory, 
primarily verbal working memory given the nature of the measures used. However, 
that anxiety level main affects appear to remain significant after controlling for working 
memory suggests the possibility that assessment anxiety level does not just impact 
the resources of working memory, and may operate through a variety of mechanisms. 
 This is supported by the correlational data, especially the logic and belief 
indices. Although working memory and reasoning ability showed a general positive 
trend, reasoning ability and anxiety showed a negative trend, and working memory 
and anxiety showed a negative trend, all of which would seem to support the idea that 
increased cognitive load due to anxiety reduces reasoning ability by depleting working 
memory resources and forcing a reliance on the heuristic system, closer inspection of 
logic and belief indices show a different pattern.   
 Although increasing anxiety reduces logical responding, it also reduces belief 
biased responding. This supports the general tenet that anxiety reduces reasoning 
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accuracy, but if the mechanism for this proposed by the DPT were correct, it would be 
expected that increased anxiety would reduce logical, but increase belief based 
responding. As such, anxiety does seem to decrease reasoning accuracy, but not by 
increasing reliance on the believability heuristic.  
These results could be explained in a number of ways. Belief bias is not the 
only form of heuristic responding. High anxiety has been associated with reduced 
impulsivity (Schweizer, 2002) and increased caution (APA, 1994), and as such, 
individuals may be more cautious when reasoning, and be able to recognise and avoid 
using belief as a cue, however, this may not leave enough cognitive capacity to then 
respond logically. As such, anxiety may help individuals avoid one heuristic, but then 
rely on another, such as the matching, atmosphere, or the MIN heuristic approaches 
(Manktelow, 2000). One mechanism through which this might occur is based on the 
suggestions of authors such as Schwarz and Clore (2003; 1983) in the emotion and 
cognition literature who have proposed that mood is used unconsciously as a cue to 
likes and dislikes, as well as error and correctness (Berridge & Winkielman, 2003). As 
such, high anxious individuals might interpret their mood as evidence that their initial 
response, likely to be that cued by belief, is incorrect, and thus utilise different 
strategies engaging different heuristics. That this would leave high anxious individuals 
more likely to reconsider their initial responses than low anxious individuals would 
account for the reduction in belief bias as anxiety increases, but still allow for the 
overall decrease in reasoning ability with increasing anxiety. 
 Alternatively, as the patterns for decreased logical and belief based reasoning 
remain after partialling out working memory and reasoning ability, it seems reasonable 
that factors besides limited working memory are responsible for the reduction in logical 
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responding, and these factors my not force a reliance on the heuristic system, thus 
creating the apparent dissociation of the heuristic and analytic systems. 
Although the idea that reduced working memory leads to worse logical 
performance (Elqayam, 2006) is supported by the results, and anxiety can reduce 
working memory, anxiety may also impact the analytic system in a selective way, 
reducing logical responding but not necessarily forcing a reliance on heuristics, 
instead striking a balance between the two to compensate for limitations. As such, the 
two systems do not appear to exist in an either-or state, rather they seem to be in a 
dynamic equilibrium and processing can involve aspects of both. Furthermore, which 
aspects of the systems are utilised does not seem to be solely governed by cognitive 
load. In addition to this it does not seem that differential allocation of resources to 
either system or to anxiety maintenance determines which system is used, given that 
the working memory central executive measure was shown not to predict heuristic 
responding, which then raises the question of what determines which aspects of each 
system are used. 
It could possibly be a combination of availability of resources, allocation of 
those resources, and some additional factor that this study did not investigate. 
Possible candidates that could provide further insight if they were included in future 
studies are strategy use (Turley-Ames & Whitfield, 2003), and purely attentional 
systems, as well as measures of inhibitory control as separate aspects of the central 
executive. Such an approach could combine the belief bias paradigm, which has 
proven to be a useful and flexible tool in this study with the emerging 
conceptualisation of the central executive as a clustered construct of different control 
systems rather than a single entity (Phillips et al, 1997). 
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In response to Johnson-Laird et al’s (2006) hyper emotion theory’s predictions 
that individual’s reason better on materials related to conditions they are suffering 
from, this study suggests otherwise. It would be expected under the hyper emotion 
theory that anxious individuals would show better reasoning on anxiety related 
content. However, anxiety was shown to decrease reasoning accuracy on both types 
of content. This might be due to differences between the samples. Whereas Johnson-
Laird et al. (2006) investigated individuals with clinical levels of various emotional 
disorders, this study looked at a sample from the general population. As such, 
although assessment anxiety in its more extreme forms might constitute a social 
phobia under DSM-IV (APA, 1994), with the scales used to measure anxiety, even 
high scorers would be grouped as the sub-clinical non-pathological anxiety category. 
Including measures of response latencies and time spent on both anxiety related and 
neutral content syllogisms in future studies would allow a more detailed look at 
reasoning differences between high and low anxious individuals by giving a clearer 
picture of attention and resource allocation. Furthermore, not controlling for time spent 
on each syllogism in the current study might have mediated belief bias effects on 
endorsement rate by allowing individuals longer on more difficult syllogisms enabling 
them to overcome belief based responses. Given that chronometric variables such as 
reducing time allowance have been shown to increase heuristic responding (Evans & 
Curtis-Holmes, 2005; De Neys, 2006), investigating heuristic and analytic responding 
between high and low anxious individuals under time-limited conditions within this 
paradigm is one possible avenue for future research. If using a general population 
sample, better discrimination between anxiety and depression (Barlow, 1991), and the 
effects of each if these conditions and their components (Alloy, 1991; McNally, 1998; 
Greco & Roger, 2001) on reasoning given the relatively high prevalence and 
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comorbidity of both in the student population and adolescent population generally 
(Garber, & Hilsman, 1992; Parker, & Roy, 2001; Chambel, & Curral, 2005; Cox, 
Fuentes, Borger, & Taylor, 2001; Wisdom & Green, 2004) might clarify the results of 
this study and possibly reconcile them with the hyper emotion theory by allowing the 
two conditions and their respective effects to be controlled for. 
 In relation to research that has found anxiety to effect primarily spatial working 
memory (Shackman, Sarinopoulos, Maxwell, Pizzagalli, Lavric, & Davidson, 2006), 
this study suggests otherwise, finding anxiety to be negatively correlated with a 
measure of verbal and central executive functioning. However, if the effect of anxiety 
is to impair the central executive’s allocation of resources, then all working memory 
tasks would be expected to show impairments. In addition to this, the discrepant 
findings may be accounted for by the fact that this study measured a combination of 
state and trait anxiety in relation to assessments, whereas Shackman et al. (2006) 
looked at induced acute state anxiety. 
Another interesting finding, although not the main focus of this study, is that the 
relationships between anxiety, logic and belief bias are very similar to the relationships 
between eating disorder proneness, logic, and belief bias. This suggests that either 
reasoning is affected in a similar way in the two conditions, or that anxiety is a 
common component of eating disorders. That the ‘views of others’ subscale scores 
provided one of the most predictive variables of belief biased responding in the 
regression analyses seems reasonable given the large component of evaluation 
apprehension seen in anxiety disorders such as social phobia and eating disorders 
such as anorexia nervosa (APA, 1994). The affect of these different aspects of anxiety 
on belief based responding further supports the suggestion that different types of 
anxiety may affect cognitive functions differently, and opens a line of investigation 
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aimed at comparing reasoning abilities within and between similar clinical conditions 
using the adapted belief bias paradigm 
This experiment, although providing support for the use of the belief bias 
paradigm in such an investigation, can only suggest correlational relationships due to 
the quasi-experimental nature of the groups used in the analyses (Evans, 2005). As 
such, future research might aim to create groups experimentally by manipulating 
anxiety or mood in order to provide evidence of causal links between anxiety, working 
memory and reasoning ability.  
 Controlling for strategy use might also allow further clarification of these results. 
A number of studies claim that syllogistic reasoning is based on verbal strategies. 
However, there is evidence that strategy use is not homogenous in the general 
population (Ford, 1995; Cybinski & Selvanathan, 2005). As such, verbal and spatial 
reasoning strategies might have been affected differentially by anxiety, leading to 
different patterns within the two groups, adding noise to the data. 
 Although anxiety is shown to decrease logical responding, the patterns of 
correlations with conflict and non-conflict indices show no clear pattern. This may be 
due to the indices being computed across different content types. However, it can be 
seen that as anxiety level increases, accuracy on conflict items increases, whereas on 
non-conflict items accuracy decreases. This could be taken as further evidence of 
caution in anxious individuals being cued by the conflict between belief and logic, 
leading to more careful reasoning on conflict items.  
Given that some researchers have reported sex differences in both levels and 
effects of anxiety (Watson, 1991), future research might look at sex differences in the 
effects of anxiety on reasoning, something that was impracticable in the current study. 
Furthermore, given the questionable generalisability of findings based on student 
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samples (Yuille & Cutshell, 1986), a replication of the methods used with a larger 
sample might give greater ecological validity to these findings. Alternatively, utilising a 
specialist sample could shed light on the relationships between anxiety, working 
memory, and reasoning, as well as analytic and heuristic processing in a clinical 
population, for example, adapting the design of this study to investigate the effects of 
anxiolytic medication (Feldman, & Quenzer, 1984) on reasoning performance. 
Including a variety of other measures to control for variables such as time of 
day could possibly clarify the contentious findings, and improve the methodology. 
Despite there being mixed evidence for effects of circadian rhythms on reasoning 
(Natale, Alzani, & Ccogna, 2003), it might prove worthwhile ruling it out as a 
confounding variable, given that circadian type, like reasoning style and strategy, is 
not homogenous in the general population and has been shown to affect performance 
on cognitive tasks (Natale et al, 2003). Furthermore, the adapted belief bias paradigm 
could be used in conjunction with neuroimaging techniques to investigated the 
biological substrates of anxiety (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002; LeDoux, 1994; 
1998); and the prefrontal cortex in relation to heuristic and analytic reasoning; 
assumed to be the seat of the central executive (Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996). Such 
a combination might allow for further investigation of the anatomical basis of the 
central executive as well as the heuristic and analytic reasoning systems. 
The unusual endorsement data may have been due to a lack of control for 
structure in the construction of the materials, resulting in differing difficulty levels 
between syllogism categories. Greater control in the construction of materials in the 
future would rule out this possibility in future studies. However, despite this, the 
patterns of effect were mainly highly statistically significant, so it is reasonable to 
assume the effects would withstand tighter methodological controls. 
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In relation to possible applications that can be developed from this research, 
the mood-as-information explanation of anxiety effects allows the possibility that 
individuals could be made conscious of their reliance on erroneous emotional cues, 
and thus evaluate situations more objectively (Caputo & Dunning, 2005). This might 
serve to improve reasoning by reducing unnecessary caution and thus unnecessary 
cognitive demands. In addition to this, having individuals develop positive future 
outcomes of test situations might reduce anxiety by alleviating negative irrelevant 
thoughts, again, increasing the availability of cognitive resources after the creation of 
these alternative positive outcomes (Broda-Bahm, 2000; Branscombe & Nario-
Redmond, 1996). Such methods might not operate as expected, that is, they might not 
improve reasoning by providing the resources necessary to use analytic processes 
rather than heuristic ones, but they might serve to shift the weight individuals give to 
the outputs of each system. Better understanding of the effects of anxiety and other 
emotions on cognitive systems has been suggested as a way of improving coping 
abilities in a number of life situations (Argyle, 1994; Goleman, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c), 
and it seems such an understanding might be beneficial to situations such as 
assessment anxiety by allowing greater control of cognitive resources and how 
individuals go about solving reasoning problems, thus improving general performance.  
In summary, the adapted belief bias paradigm seems methodologically suited 
to investigating the effects of content and anxiety on heuristic and analytic processes 
under a dual process framework, although a few refinements and adjustments of the 
additional factors would be beneficial in future research. The overall effects of anxiety 
level and anxiety related content was to reduce performance on syllogistic reasoning 
and working memory tasks, as expected. However, although a dual process 
framework allows for the combination of a number of other theoretical models and 
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ideas, such as Oksford et al.’s (1996) optimal hypothesis testing and Eysenck and 
Calvo’s (1992) processing efficiency model under a single account, the mechanism 
through which anxiety has these effects is not solely based in the working memory 
system. Furthermore, although anxiety reduces reasoning accuracy, it does not 
appear to do this by forcing reliance on heuristic processes such as belief biased 
responding. Additional research is needed to identify more clearly how these effects 
are mediated and refine the dual process theory of reasoning, but the current study 
provides some interesting preliminary findings.  
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Appendix A: Syllogism Pool 
 
 
Assessment Anxiety (AA) Loaded Syllogisms; numbers 01-12, Eating Disorders (01) Loaded 
Syllogisms; numbers 13-24, Eating Disorder Loaded (ED1 and ED2) Syllogisms; numbers 25-36, 
Neutral Syllogisms (NS); numbers 37-48 
 
 
AA Valid Believable 
     
01 All exams are difficult  
All difficult tasks are stressful  
Therefore, all exams are stressful 
02 All essays are difficult  
Some exams are essay based.  
Therefore, some exams are 
difficult 
 
     
03 No students are anxious. 
Some lecturers are students. 
Therefore, Some lecturers are not 
anxious. 
   
     
 
AA Valid Unbelievable 
     
04 All presentations are relaxing 
Some exams are presentations  
Therefore, some exams are 
relaxing 
05 Some students are anxious 
All anxious people are millionaires 
Therefore, some students are 
millionaires 
 
     
06 No exams can be passed.  
All essays are exams  
Therefore, no essay based 
coursework can be passed 
   
     
 
AA Invalid Believable 
     
07 All students are in their twenties 
Some anxious people are not in 
their twenties 
Some of the students are anxious 
08 All exams cause heart-rate 
increases 
No difficult coursework is part of 
exams 
Some difficult coursework causes 
heart-rate increases 
 
     
09 All of the students are nervous 
Some hyper-tension sufferers are 
not nervous 
Some of the students are hyper-
tension sufferers 
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AA Invalid Unbelievable 
     
10 No exams are essay based 
Some essays are hard 
Therefore no exams are hard 
11 Some Students are Anxious 
All Anxious people suffer panic 
attacks 
Therefore, all Students suffer 
panic attacks 
 
     
12 Some nervous people are not 
lecturers 
All nervous people are successful 
Some of the lecturers are not 
successful people 
   
     
 
ED1 Valid Believable 
     
13 No bulimics are unhappy 
Some women are unhappy 
Therefore some women are not 
bulimic 
14 No anorexics are perfect 
Some girls are perfect 
Therefore some girls are not 
anorexic 
 
     
15 No dieter is happy 
Some girls are happy 
Therefore some girls are not 
dieters 
   
     
 
ED1 Valid Unbelievable 
     
16 No healthy foods are fattening 
Some lettuces are fattening 
Therefore, some lettuces are not 
healthy 
17 All high calorie foods are delicious 
Some low calorie foods are 
delicious 
Therefore, some low calorie foods 
are high calorie foods 
 
     
18 No low fat foods are fattening 
Some chocolate bars are 
fattening 
Therefore some chocolate bars 
are not low fat foods. 
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ED1 Invalid Believable 
     
19 Some dieting methods are 
harmful 
Some exercises are harmful 
Therefore some dieting methods 
are exercises 
20 Some thin people are miserable 
Some eating disorder sufferers are 
miserable 
Therefore some thin people are 
eating disorder sufferers 
 
     
21 No ways to lose weight are easy 
Some diets are easy 
Therefore some ways to lose 
weight are not diets 
   
     
 
ED1 Invalid Unbelievable 
     
22 No anorexics are underweight 
Some eating disorder sufferers 
are underweight 
Therefore, some anorexics are 
not eating disorder sufferers 
23 No people on diets are happy 
Some girls are happy 
Therefore, people on diets are not 
girls 
 
     
24 No anorexics are chocolate eaters 
Some girls are chocolate eaters 
Therefore, all anorexics are not 
girls 
   
     
 
ED2 Valid Believable 
     
25 All of the gymnasts have toned 
legs  
All people with toned legs are slim  
Therefore, all gymnasts are slim 
26 All supermodels have flat 
stomachs  
All people with flat stomachs are 
slender 
Therefore, all supermodels are 
slender 
 
     
27 No individual who eats lots of 
chips is healthy  
Some larger people eat lots of 
chips  
Therefore, some larger people are 
not healthy 
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ED2 Valid Unbelievable 
     
28 All the thin people are beautiful  
All the beautiful people are happy  
Therefore, all thin people are 
happy. 
29 No person who eats too much has 
slim legs  
Some thin people eat too much  
Therefore, some thin people do 
not have slim legs 
 
     
30 All people who are overweight like 
to eat celery  
People who like celery are intent 
on eating healthy  
Therefore, all overweight people 
are intent on eating healthily 
   
 
ED2 Invalid Believable 
     
31 Some oversized people hate their 
legs  
All oversized people eat too much 
chocolate  
Therefore some oversized people 
do not have thin legs 
32 Some thin people think they have 
big buttocks  
All people who think they have big 
buttocks exercise regularly  
Therefore some thin people do not 
exercise regularly 
 
     
33 No objects that can help you lose 
weight are inexpensive  
Some herbal diet pills are 
inexpensive  
Therefore herbal diet pills help 
you lose weight 
   
     
 
ED2 Invalid Unbelievable 
     
34 All overweight people have big 
buttocks in relation to their body 
shape  
Some size six people have big 
buttocks in relation to their body 
shape  
Therefore some overweight 
people are a size six 
35 Some overweight people do not 
exercise excessively  
All overweight people have large 
abdomens  
Therefore, some people with large 
abdomens exercise excessively 
 
     
36 Some people with oversized 
thighs do not watch what they eat  
No thin people watch what they 
eat  
Therefore, some thin people have 
oversized thighs 
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NS Valid Believable 
     
37 All nurses are hospital workers  
All hospital workers are required 
to work night shifts  
Therefore, all nurses are required 
to work night shifts 
38 All swans are white.  
Some birds are swans.  
Therefore, some birds are white. 
 
     
39 No geese are felines. 
Some birds are geese. 
Therefore, Some birds are not 
felines. 
   
     
NS Valid Unbelievable 
     
40 All fungi are not edible  
Mushrooms are fungi  
Therefore, mushrooms are not 
edible 
41 Some monkeys are aliens 
All aliens are blue 
Therefore, some monkeys are 
blue 
 
     
42 No birds can fly.  
All sparrows are birds.  
Therefore, no sparrows can fly 
   
     
NS Invalid Believable 
     
43 All of the cats are rabid 
Some of the animals are not rabid 
Some of the cats are animals 
44 All of the librarians are doctors 
Some of the sculptors are 
librarians 
None of the sculptors are doctors 
 
     
45 All of the parents are teachers 
Some of the drivers are not 
teachers 
Some of the parents are drivers 
   
     
NS Invalid Unbelievable 
     
46 No doctors are kind  
Some kind people are in the 
medical profession  
Therefore no doctors are 
professionals 
47 Some Dogs are Chefs 
All Chefs are Yellow 
Therefore, all Dogs are Yellow 
 
     
48 Some of the doctors are not 
clowns 
All of the doctors are intellectuals 
Some of the clowns are not 
intellectuals 
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Table B1.1 ANOVA Table for 2 Content (Anxiety, Neutral) x 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 2 
Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 Anxiety (High, Low) based on Accuracy scores 
Within-Subjects Factors df Mean
2 
Eta
2 
F Sig. 
Content 1 11.144 .388 39.347 .000 
Content * AA_MedianGroups 1 .382 .021 1.348 .250 
Error(Content) 62 .283       
Validity 1 55.450 .598 92.339 .000 
Validity * AA_MedianGroups 1 2.420 .061 4.031 .049 
Error(Validity) 62 .601       
Believability 1 3.262 .128 9.066 .004 
Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .593 .026 1.648 .204 
Error(Believability) 62 .360       
Content * Validity 1 .292 .021 1.333 .253 
Content * Validity * AA_MedianGroups 1 .384 .027 1.751 .191 
Error(Content*Validity) 62 .219       
Content * Believability 1 1.169 .084 5.670 .020 
Content * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .110 .009 .533 .468 
Error(Content*Believability) 62 .206       
Validity * Believability 1 1.764 .055 3.609 .062 
Validity * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 3.611 .106 7.387 .009 
Error(Validity*Believability) 62 .489       
Content * Validity * Believability 1 4.540 .201 15.615 .000 
Content * Validity * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .615 .033 2.115 .151 
Error(Content*Validity*Believability) 62 .291       
Between-Subjects Factors df Mean
2 
Eta
2 
F Sig. 
AA_MedianGroups 1 1.875 2.176 .145 .034 
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Table B1.2 ANCOVA Table for 2 Content (Anxiety, Neutral) x 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 2 
Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 Anxiety (High, Low) with WMCE score covaried 
Within-Subjects Factors df Mean
2 
Eta
2 
F Sig. 
Content 1 .290 .018 1.066 .306 
Content * WMCE_Score 1 .055 .003 .201 .655 
Content * AA_MedianGroups 1 .107 .007 .393 .533 
Error(Content) 58 .273       
Validity 1 1.859 .049 2.979 .090 
Validity * WMCE_Score 1 .155 .004 .249 .620 
Validity * AA_MedianGroups 1 2.303 .060 3.690 .060 
Error(Validity) 58 .624       
Believability 1 .005 .000 .014 .906 
Believability * WMCE_Score 1 .213 .011 .633 .430 
Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .995 .049 2.959 .091 
Error(Believability) 58 .336       
Content * Validity 1 .254 .019 1.147 .289 
Content * Validity * WMCE_Score 1 .407 .031 1.840 .180 
Content * Validity * AA_MedianGroups 1 .409 .031 1.849 .179 
Error(Content*Validity) 58 .221       
Content * Believability 1 .199 .019 1.100 .299 
Content * Believability * WMCE_Score 1 .041 .004 .228 .635 
Content * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .229 .021 1.264 .265 
Error(Content*Believability) 58 .181       
Validity * Believability 1 .022 .001 .046 .832 
Validity * Believability * WMCE_Score 1 .016 .001 .032 .858 
Validity * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 2.781 .090 5.740 .020 
Error(Validity*Believability) 58 .485       
Content * Validity * Believability 1 1.057 .058 3.564 .064 
Content * Validity * Believability * WMCE_Score 1 .276 .016 .930 .339 
Content * Validity * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .563 .032 1.898 .174 
Error(Content*Validity*Believability) 58 .296       
Between-Subjects Factors df Mean
2 
Eta
2 
F Sig. 
WMCE_Score 1 1.339 1.628 .207 .027 
AA_MedianGroups 1 1.100 1.337 .252 .023 
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Table B2.0 ANOVA Table for 2 Content (Anxiety, Neutral) x 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 2 
Believability (Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 Anxiety (High, Low)based on Endorsement Rate 
Within-Subjects Effects df Mean
2
 Eta
2
 F Sig. 
Content 1 .292 .021 1.333 .253 
Content * AA_MedianGroups 1 .384 .027 1.751 .191 
Error(Content) 62 .219      
Validity 1 292.128 .845 339.034 .000 
Validity * AA_MedianGroups 1 1.875 .034 2.176 .145 
Error(Validity) 62 .862      
Believability 1 1.764 .055 3.609 .062 
Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 3.611 .106 7.387 .009 
Error(Believability) 62 .489      
Content * Validity 1 11.144 .388 39.347 .000 
Content * Validity * AA_MedianGroups 1 .382 .033 1.348 .250 
Error(Content*Validity) 62 .283      
Content * Believability 1 4.540 .201 15.615 .000 
Content * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .615 .033 2.115 .151 
Error(Content*Believability) 62 .291      
Validity * Believability 1 3.262 .128 9.066 .004 
Validity * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .593 .026 1.648 .204 
Error(Validity*Believability) 62 .360      
Content * Validity * Believability 1 1.169 .084 5.670 .020 
Content * Validity * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .110 .009 .533 .468 
Error(Content*Validity*Believability) 62 .206      
Between-Subjects Effects df Mean
2
 Eta
2
 F Sig. 
AA_MedianGroups 1 2.420 .061 4.031 .049 
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Table B2.1 ANCOVA Table for 2 Content (Anxiety, Neutral) x 2 Validity (Valid, Invalid) x 2 Believability 
(Believable, Unbelievable) x 2 Anxiety (High, Low) based on endorsement data with WMCE score 
covaried 
Within-Subjects Effects df Mean
2
 Eta
2
 F Sig. 
Content 1 .254 .019 1.147 .289 
Content * AA_MedianGroups 1 .409 .031 1.849 .179 
Error(Content) 58 .221      
Validity 1 8.111 .145 9.860 .003 
Validity * AA_MedianGroups 1 1.100 .023 1.337 .252 
Error(Validity) 58 .823      
Believability 1 .022 .001 .046 .832 
Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 2.781 .090 5.740 .020 
Error(Believability) 58 .485      
Content * Validity 1 .290 .018 1.066 .306 
Content * Validity * AA_MedianGroups 1 .107 .007 .393 .533 
Error(Content*Validity) 58 .273      
Content * Believability 1 1.057 .058 3.564 .064 
Content * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .563 .032 1.898 .174 
Error(Content*Believability) 58 .296      
Validity * Believability 1 .005 .000 .014 .906 
Validity * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .995 .049 2.959 .091 
Error(Validity*Believability) 58 .336      
Content * Validity * Believability 1 .199 .019 1.100 .299 
Content * Validity * Believability * AA_MedianGroups 1 .229 .021 1.264 .265 
Error(Content*Validity*Believability) 58 .181      
Between-Subjects Effects df Mean
2
 Eta
2
 F Sig. 
WMCE_Score 1 .155 .004 .249 .620 
AA_MedianGroups 1 2.303 .060 3.690 .060 
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Table B4.0 Partial Correlations between Indices of Logic, Belief, Conflict and Non-Conflict, 
and Anxiety, showing partialling out of WMCE and RA, WMCE alone, and RA alone. 
   Indices 
Control Indices AA Belief 
Logic 
ACon 
Logic 
NCon 
Conflict 
Non 
Conflict 
W
M
C
E
 S
c
o
re
 a
n
d
 R
e
a
s
o
n
in
g
 
A
b
ili
ty
 
AA total Corr 1.000 -.407(**) -.035 .036 .208 -.204 
 Sig . .002 .802 .793 .128 .136 
Belief  Corr -.407 1.000 .163 -.163 -.584(**) .417(**) 
 Sig .002 . .233 .234 .000 .002 
Logic ACon  Corr -.035 .163 1.000 -1.000 -.190 -.038 
 Sig .802 .233 . .000 .164 .781 
Logic NCon  Corr .036 -.163 -1.000 1.000 .190 .038 
 Sig .793 .234 .000 . .164 .780 
Conflict Corr .208 -.584(**) -.190 .190 1.000 .495(**) 
 Sig .128 .000 .164 .164 . .000 
W
M
C
E
 
AA total Corr 1.000 -.433(**) -.170 -.109 .256 -.165 
 Sig . .001 .211 .425 .057 .225 
Belief  Corr -.433(**) 1.000 .316(**) .125 -.627(**) .337(**) 
 Sig .001 . .018 .359 .000 .011 
Logic ACon  Corr -.170 .316(**) 1.000 .578(**) -.449(**) -.197 
 Sig .211 .018 . .000 .001 .145 
Logic NCon  Corr -.109 .125 .578(**) 1.000 -.220 -.129 
 Sig .425 .359 .000 . .103 .343 
Conflict Corr .256 -.627(**) -.449(**) -.220 1.000 .522(**) 
 Sig .057 .000 .001 .103 . .000 
R
e
a
s
o
n
in
g
 A
b
ili
ty
 
AA total Corr 1.000 -.363(**) -.007 -.001 .165 -.221 
 Sig . .006 .957 .993 .221 .099 
Belief  Corr -.363(**) 1.000 .201 -.236 -.622(**) .415(**) 
 Sig .006 . .134 .077 .000 .001 
Logic ACon  Corr -.007 .201 1.000 -.993(**) -.232 -.041 
 Sig .957 .134 . .000 .083 .762 
Logic NCon  Corr -.001 -.236 -.993(**) 1.000 .262(*) .035 
 Sig .993 .077 .000 . .049 .794 
Conflict Corr .165 -.622(**) -.232 .262(*) 1.000 .454(**) 
 Sig .221 .000 .083 .049 . .000 
* significant at p<.05, ** significant at p<.01 
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Table B5.0 Regression Models with Belief Index score as the DV 
Model   Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 144.387 10 14.439 2.087 .044 
  Residual 332.156 48 6.920   
  Total 476.542 58    
2 Regression 144.386 9 16.043 2.367 .026 
  Residual 332.156 49 6.779   
  Total 476.542 58    
3 Regression 143.164 8 17.896 2.684 .015 
  Residual 333.378 50 6.668   
  Total 476.542 58    
4 Regression 141.262 7 20.180 3.070 .009 
  Residual 335.280 51 6.574   
  Total 476.542 58    
5 Regression 137.861 6 22.977 3.528 .005 
  Residual 338.681 52 6.513   
  Total 476.542 58    
6 Regression 132.587 5 26.517 4.086 .003 
  Residual 343.955 53 6.490   
  Total 476.542 58    
7 Regression 123.624 4 30.906 4.729 .002 
  Residual 352.918 54 6.536   
  Total 476.542 58    
8 Regression 117.798 3 39.266 6.020 .001 
  Residual 358.745 55 6.523   
  Total 476.542 58    
9 Regression 108.151 2 54.075 8.220 .001 
  Residual 368.392 56 6.578   
  Total 476.542 58    
Predictor variables of models: 
1  
NContentRAacc, AA_Bodily, Reasoning_Ability, WMCE_Score, AA_ViewsOfOthers, 
AnxContRAacc, AA_General, ATT_total, AA_Thoughts, AA_SelfImage 
2 
NContentRAacc, AA_Bodily, Reasoning_Ability, WMCE_Score, AA_ViewsOfOthers, 
AnxContRAacc, AA_General, ATT_total, AA_Thoughts 
3 
NContentRAacc, Reasoning_Ability, WMCE_Score, AA_ViewsOfOthers, AnxContRAacc, 
AA_General, ATT_total, AA_Thoughts 
4 
NContentRAacc, Reasoning_Ability, AA_ViewsOfOthers, AnxContRAacc, AA_General, 
ATT_total, AA_Thoughts 
5 
NContentRAacc, Reasoning_Ability, AA_ViewsOfOthers, AnxContRAacc, ATT_total, 
AA_Thoughts 
6 NContentRAacc, Reasoning_Ability, AA_ViewsOfOthers, AnxContRAacc, ATT_total 
7 Reasoning_Ability, AA_ViewsOfOthers, AnxContRAacc, ATT_total 
8 Reasoning_Ability, AA_ViewsOfOthers, ATT_total 
9 Reasoning_Ability, AA_ViewsOfOthers 
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Table B5.1 Regression model summaries 
Model R R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 Std. Error 
1 .550 .303 .158 2.631 
2 .550 .303 .175 2.604 
3 .548 .300 .188 2.582 
4 .544 .296 .200 2.564 
5 .538 .289 .207 2.552 
6 .527 .278 .210 2.547 
7 .509 .259 .205 2.556 
8 .497 .247 .206 2.554 
9 .476 .227 .199 2.564 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
